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INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION AND PRIVATIZATION OF SOLID WASTE SERVICES AMONG 
SMALL MUNICIPALITIES IN SPAIN 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the organization of the solid waste service in Europe has grown in complexity. A 
set of European Union directives now obliges member states to reduce their waste production 
and to adopt measures to recover waste by means of recycling (Article 3 of Directive 
2006/12/EC), while at the same time, the management of solid waste services has undergone 
major changes with a growth in the contracting-out of this service.  
Today, private production in urban solid waste services is extremely widespread in 
Europe (Warner and Bel, 2008; Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2008). In over half of Spain’s 
municipalities (Bel 2006a), this service is handled privately; and, in the region of Aragon, where 
we focus our study, private production is the majority practice, being present in more than 60% 
of the municipalities, and serving more than 80% of the population.  
One reason commonly forwarded for contracting-out solid waste services is to lower 
service production costs; however, the empirical evidence regarding such savings are somewhat 
ambiguous (Bel and Warner, 2008). Recently, Warner and Hefetz (2003) and Bel and Costas 
(2006) have suggested that intermunicipal cooperation might be a viable alternative to local 
privatization, especially in smaller municipalities with a lower number of potential outside 
contractors. Interestingly, intermunicipal cooperation has been shown to be incompatible with 
private production in the US (Warner and Hefetz, 2002a, 2002b), Norway (Sørensen, 2007) and 
the Netherlands (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007), but this is not the case in Spain (Warner and Bel, 
2008). Building on the findings of these earlier studies, this study considers the intermunicipal 
cooperation provided by comarcas (counties) and mancomunidades (associations of municipalities) in 
order to test the hypothesis that such cooperation plays a key role in enabling scale economies to 
be exploited, both in private and public production.  
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The aim of this study, therefore, is to examine the effects of cooperation and a pattern 
of highly dispersed municipalities on the costs of solid waste service under private and public 
production. To this end, this paper analyses the urban solid waste service in the Autonomous 
Region of Aragon, chosen because it comprises a large number of very small municipalities, a 
level of organization that has typically been ignored, or is at least very poorly represented, in 
previous analyses. In this sense, our work contributes to the specific analysis of this issue as it 
relates to sparsely populated municipalities, which would appear to provide suitable conditions 
for achieving scale economies either through intermunicipal cooperation or privatization.  
The rest of this study is organized into four sections. In the section that follows, we 
review the empirical research analyzing the costs paid for solid waste services, with special 
emphasis on organizational issues and, particularly, on the relationship between the form of 
service production and costs. In the third section, we specify and estimate an econometric model 
adapted to the unique characteristics of our geographical area of reference. In the fourth section, 
we present the main results obtained from the above estimation. Finally, we summarize our 
conclusions. 
 
2. Solid waste organization, form of production, and costs: empirical evidence 
In this paper we undertake a review of previous empirical studies of the factors that have a 
bearing on municipal costs for solid waste services in large samples of municipalities, and which 
have analyzed the relationship between public production, private production and costs. More 
specifically we are concerned here with econometric studies that have used multivariate analysis 
and which employ control variables to ensure the robustness of their results, since this is the aim 
of our own study.  
The relation between the costs of solid waste services and their public or private 
production has been carefully examined in many articles, the first of which can be traced back to 
Hirsch (1965). From Hirsch to the mid-70s, several econometric studies attempted to explain the 
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costs of urban solid waste services (Kitchen, 1976; Kemper & Quigley, 1976; Collins & Downes, 
1977), but any conclusions were largely preliminary in nature and they failed to find any common 
effects in their various models, due primarily to limitations in data availability and the exploratory 
nature of the specified models. Thus, for example, the form of service production, when 
included, gave rise to contradictory results in the models. The estimations of Kemper and 
Quigley (1976, 64) and Collins and Downes (1977, 344) indicated that private (market) provision 
was more expensive than municipal (public) provision. Within municipal provision, but Hirsch 
(1965, 91) and Collins and Downes (1977, 344) failed to find any significant differences in costs 
between public and private delivery; however, in Kitchen (1976, 70) and Kemper and Quigley 
(1976, 64) contracting-out was associated with lower costs than public delivery. 
In seeking to identify the existence of scale economies in output, Hirsch (1965) and 
Kemper and Quigley (1976) reported their absence for this service provision. Elsewhere, Collins 
and Downes (1977) reported scale diseconomies for very small collection systems. And finally, 
Kitchen (1976) obtained an inverse U-shape in his analysis of scale economies with diseconomies 
of density in the cost (where economies of density referred to variations in average costs when 
faced with changes in the concentration of the population served).  
From the late seventies onwards, more robust empirical studies were published, 
including those of Pommerehne and Frey (1977), Stevens (1978), Tickner & McDavid (1986), 
Domberger, Meadowcroft & Thompson (1986), Dubin & Navarro (1988,) Szymanski & Wilkins 
(1993), Szymanski (1996) and Reeves and Barrow (2000). The main innovation in each of these 
studies was that, thanks to the wider availability of information and the improvement in technical 
statistics, their results were more robust. In strict comparisons of public and private forms of 
production, some studies reported the cost of the service to be higher in municipalities 
employing public production, independently of the existence of competition [Pommerehne & 
Frey (1977, 233), Tickner & McDavid (1986, 358), Reeves & Barrow (2000, 141)]. In others, such 
as Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986, 79) and Szymanski and Wilkins (1993, 124), 
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private and public costs seemed not to differ with competitive bidding; however, in Szymanski 
(1996, 11), private costs were lower than public costs with competitive bidding as well, since the 
advantages of competitive contracting were gradually eroded over time. This phenomenon was 
reported as developing less quickly in the case of contracts won by private companies, but more 
rapidly in those secured by public units. 
Most studies have identified the existence of scale economies, albeit that they tend to 
disappear as population (output) grows [e.g., Stevens (1978), Bel and Costas (2006)]. Other 
factors that have come under analysis, however, have presented less ambiguous results, and thus, 
larger amounts of waste, increased collection frequency, or higher salary costs increase costs. 
Finally, the statistical results for other explanatory factors do not show statistical significance or 
offer mixed results. 
In addition to the studies published at the end of the 20th century, more recent analyses 
have tended to adopt more sophisticated and robust statistical techniques in comparing municipal 
costs for the public and private management of waste services. While the majority estimate total 
costs for the service, they have tended to analyze very different contexts. Dijkgraaf and Gradus 
(2003, 2007) in Holland, Bel and Costas (2006) in Spain, and Ohlsson (2003) in Sweden employ a 
double logarithmic form. Callan and Thomas (2001), meanwhile, used a linear functional form of 
the cost equation in their study for the US. 
These studies indicate that the costs of public and private production do not differ 
significantly. Interestingly, Ohlsson (2003) finds private production to be more costly than public 
production. All in all, these models tend to reiterate earlier findings that the competition for 
service production is more important than ownership. Based on their review of empirical studies 
of solid waste, Bel and Warner (2008) suggest that the lack of competition might explain why in 
many cases no evidence is found of a positive effect being derived from contracting out.  
More ambiguous results are obtained in response to such questions as the existence of 
scale economies or economies of density. Meanwhile, a greater volume of waste generated, the 
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amount of selective waste, the number of collection points, wage level, frequency of service, and 
a longer distance to the landfill site tend to have a positive and significant effect on costs.  
Finally, two recent papers have explicitly addressed the influence of intermunicipal 
cooperation on costs. Bel and Costas (2006) studied the effects of cooperation and of old versus 
new experiences of privatization. On the one hand, intermunicipal cooperation was found to 
reduce costs. On the other, they found that the cost savings derived from contracting out tended 
to disappear over time and, hence, the more recent the experience of contracting out, the greater 
the competition and, therefore, the greater the negative effect recorded on service costs. The 
detrimental impact of business concentration and lack of competition are also noted by Dijkgraaf 
and Gradus (2007). 
Sørensen (2007) explicitly considers the existence of inter-municipal cooperation in solid 
waste services as well. Unlike the studies previously reviewed, he does not adopt the Hirsch-
Stevens model, nor does he examine the relationship between public or private ownership and 
costs. Using a sample of Norwegian municipalities, Sørensen takes the cost per inhabitant of the 
service as the explained variable, and considers as explanatory variables different measures of 
ownership concentration (including the use of inter-municipal companies or cooperation), 
municipal revenues, population density, and the population of the municipality. Sørensen’s 
empirical results suggest that municipalities that cooperate bear a cost for the service that is 
around 10% higher than those municipalities that do not cooperate. In many cases, the loss of 
efficiency attributable to the presence of various owners is greater than the cost reduction 
obtained through scale economies. 
To sum up, based on our review of the literature that analyses the municipal cost 
structure of solid waste services, it can be seen that in the most robust studies, no significant 
differences are systematically observed between public and private delivery. As far as the other 
variables are concerned, the amount of waste generated and, alternatively, the population served 
as an approximation of output, increased collection frequency, the distance to the disposal site 
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and greater salary costs significantly increase the municipal costs of this service. However, the 
existence in the municipality of waste disposal facilities reduces costs. Ambiguous results are 
obtained regarding intermunicipal cooperation: cost reduction in Bel and Costas (2006), and cost 
increase in Sørensen (2007). Meanwhile, questions such as the existence of scale economies offer 
ambiguous evidence as well 
 
3. Empirical study 
In this section we conduct an empirical analysis of the relation between intermunicipal 
cooperation and the costs of the solid waste service in a region of small municipalities. As is 
customary in comparable studies, our model incorporates other variables which we expect to 
have some incidence on the dependent variable. 
 
3.1. The model and the data 
In order that we might compare our results with those contained in econometric studies 
published elsewhere, the techniques applied here are the same as those used in the studies 
reviewed above. Thus, the basic function of the municipal cost of solid waste services takes the 
following form: 
TC= ƒ(Pop, Freq, Land, Dens, Disp, Prod, Coop, Wage)   (1) 
 
The dependent variable, which we shall call TC, is the total municipal cost paid for solid 
waste services in the municipalities of Aragon. This includes collection, transportation, and 
disposal and elimination. The total costs incurred by the municipality are determined by the 
population of the municipality (Pop) [a proxy for the amount of waste generated], a variable that 
reflects the quality of the service - collection frequency (Freq), a number of service conditions that 
affect the requirements of input (Land, Dens, Disp, Prod, Coop), and the price of the labor factor 
(Wage).  
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The data relating to municipal costs were obtained through the preparation and 
subsequent implementation of the 1st Survey on the Production of Urban Solid Waste Services and Water 
Supply in Aragon (referred to below as the Survey), which enabled us to obtain complete 
information for 56 municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants [Mur (2008) provides detailed 
information on the sample]. Table 1 shows the general characteristics of the sample obtained. 
The sample includes 50% of the Aragonese municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants. 
Additionally, the sample includes 44.60% of the municipalities with a population below 5,000 
inhabitants, a very high percentage for municipalities of this size. It should be noted that few 
econometric studies include significant information for municipalities with fewer than 5,000 
inhabitants. In the case of mid-sized (from 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants) and large (over 10,000 
inhabitants) municipalities, the sample contains 75% of the municipalities.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
If we consider the number of inhabitants served, the level of coverage is actually higher 
than the number of municipalities. This is because the frequency of responses grows with the size 
of the population, resulting in some ranges being over-represented. The population analyzed 
represents 87.4% of the total population of municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants, but 
if the comparison is made with the entire population of Aragon, then the sample includes 75.25% 
of the total population. 
Below we define the explanatory variables used in our model. We also provide 
information on the data sources, and describe the expected effects of each variable. All the data 
used in the empirical analysis refer to 2003. 
1) Population of the municipality, Pop. Information on waste generated at the local level 
could not be obtained, as most municipalities did not have records on the amounts generated. As 
an approximation of output, we use the population of the municipality according to the 2003 
census of inhabitants. We call this first explanatory variable Pop, and we expect to find a 
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significant and positive relation between population and total costs. Population data were 
obtained from the Spanish National Statistic Institute.  
2) Collection frequency, Freq. We include the variable of weekly frequency (Freq) to 
show the number of days waste is collected each week. This variable was obtained from the 1st 
Survey on the Production of Urban Solid Waste Services and Water Supply in Aragon. In line with the 
literature we expect to find a positive relation between the variable Freq and costs, i.e.,  as 
collection frequency increases, so do service costs.  
3) Municipal landfill, Land. We adopt a dummy variable to reflect the existence of a 
landfill in the municipal area. This variable takes the value 1 if the municipality has a landfill, and 
the value 0 if not. This suggests that transport costs are higher when there is no landfill in the 
municipality. Consequently, we expect this variable to have a negative effect on costs. The 
information for 2003 was obtained from the Survey.  
4) Municipal density, Dens. We take ‘population density’, defined as the number of 
inhabitants per square kilometer, as an indicator. The data on population and municipal sizes 
were obtained from the website of the Spanish National Statistics Institute (http://www.ine.es). 
As population density increases, the amount of waste collected at each stop grows, in principle 
reducing the costs of collection. However, greater population concentration leads to greater 
problems of traffic congestion, so that over time, transport time can be greater and so, therefore, 
can costs . Thus, the final effect of the variable Dens is a priori undetermined. 
5) Dispersion of municipalities, Disp. One variable that can affect costs is the number 
of population units within a municipal jurisdiction. This variable has not previously been 
considered in the economic literature on waste services, and as such constitutes a significant 
innovation in our analysis. Data describing the dispersion of municipalities were gathered from 
the information published on the website of the Instituto Aragonés de Estadística 
(http://www.portal.aragob.es). In Aragon, the population is very unevenly distributed 
throughout the territory. In fact, half the population is concentrated in the city of Zaragoza, and 
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the rest is distributed over more than 700 municipalities. Consequently, the population of these 
municipalities tends to be very small and the jurisdictions are typically made up of scattered, small 
population centers. For this reason, waste collection can be more expensive as the distances 
separating the different population centers within a municipal area need to be covered. 
Therefore, we expect the variable Disp to have a positive effect on costs. 
6) Private production, Prod. To capture the influence of either the private or public 
production of the service on costs, we include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
service is delivered by a private firm, and the value 0 in the case of public production (direct 
management or public firm). Data describing the form of production were obtained from the 
Survey. In Aragon, private production of the service is particularly widespread (see Table 2) with 
62.90% of the municipalities being served by private firms. This form of production is the 
majority in all population ranges, with the exception of the largest. However, in line with the 
recent literature, the expected effect of this variable is undetermined. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
7) Municipal cooperation, Coop. This variable is represented by a dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 if the municipality is significantly involved in intermunicipal cooperation, 
through a comarca or mancomunidad, and 0 if not. As discussed above, the empirical literature 
considers intermunicipal cooperation as an alternative to privatization for smaller municipalities 
with fewer available external contractors (Warner and Hefetz, 20003). In this way, smaller 
municipalities are able to exploit scale economies.  
Table 3 shows the extent of municipal cooperation in waste services in relation to the 
size of the municipality. In Aragon, characterized by a preponderance of small municipalities and 
very few large cities, cooperation in solid waste services is particularly widespread, which means 
the  “municipal cooperation” variable is of great relevance to this study.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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To determine whether municipal cooperation is a formula that can be used to exploit 
scale economies, we include the variable Coop. We assume that municipalities co-operate so as to 
reduce costs, therefore, a priori, the expected effect of this variable on costs is negative. However, 
in line with previous studies (Bel and Costas, 2006), we do not expect the effect of this variable 
to be significant for municipalities with larger populations. Such a finding would be consistent 
with results in Sørensen (2007). 
8) Wage level, Wage. This variable is measured as a salary cost (in euros) per employee 
in the private services sector for each province of Aragon, in 2003. Price differences in 
productive factors, in particular the variability in wages between municipalities, can influence the 
total municipal costs of the service. However, as there is no information available on local wage 
levels, we have opted to calculate the wage level for each province of Aragon, based on the 
average provincial value for each municipality. This approach, however, is consistent with the 
widespread practice of collective bargaining at the provincial level in Spain. Alcaide and Alcaide 
(2003) provide estimations of labor costs at the province level, differentiating between public and 
private service sectors. Since 62.90% of the municipalities in the sample have privatized waste 
services, we have preferred to use the labor costs for the private sector. The expected effect of 
provincial salary cost in the private services sector is, in line with the empirical literature, positive 
and significant. 
Table 4 describes the variables that we use in our applied study, and their expected sign. 
Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the model’s variables. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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3.2. The estimated equation 
A more precise description of the general model with which we are working, based on 
the costs function (1) given above, is: 
TCi = 0Popi
1 Disp i
2 Densi
3 Freqi
4 Wagei
5 e(6Prodi + 7Landi+ 8Coopi + ui) 
Following the empirical literature, the double logarithmic form was estimated including 
the logarithms of the dependent and independent variables within the equation. This section 
presents the results obtained, therefore, with the estimation of the equation: 
Log TCi = 0 + 1logPopi + 2 logDispi + 3 logDensi + 4 logFreqi + 5 logWagei + 6 Prodi + 7Landi 
+8 Coopi + ui 
Stevens (1978) questioned the structural stability of the cost equation based on 
municipality size and reported evidence of a different structure in large and small municipalities. 
Subsequently, Dubin and Navarro (1988) and Bel and Costas (2006) similarly divided the sample 
according to population size. These empirical studies have identified scale economies among 
municipalities with smaller populations, but that these gradually disappear beyond a certain 
population size. Therefore, we have considered it appropriate to divide the sample into different 
subgroups by population (municipalities up to 5,000 inhabitants, up to 10,000, and up to 20,000) 
and to estimate the equations for each of these subgroups. In this study we have opted for this 
criterion of segmentation as a further breakdown would have resulted in estimations with very 
few observations. 
 
4. Results 
Table 6 presents the results obtained from the estimation of the equation for the aggregate 
sample. In general, neither the perturbation nor the systematic part of the model presents serious 
problems, suggesting that this would be a valid model for explaining annual costs for solid waste 
services. The value of R2 is over 90%, indicating a very high explanatory capacity for the 
variability of the total costs paid by municipalities, as is common in studies of this type. The F-
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test indicates that the fit of the equation is very significant at the 1% level. The Ramsey-RESET 
test shows that there are no problems regarding the absence of significant variables in the model 
at a confidence level of 99%.  
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Below, we focus on the variables contained in the model and examine their influence on total 
costs. In general, the signs of these variables (listed in Table 6) were as expected in theoretical 
terms. The population of the municipality variable has a positive and very significant relation to 
costs, with a confidence level higher than 99%, indicating that this variable - an approximation of 
the amount of waste generated - is a major determinant of total costs. Higher salary costs also 
affect service costs positively, confirming the hypothesis that higher provincial salary costs in the 
private services sector have a positive relation with the costs of solid waste services.  
The variable measuring “the dispersion of population centers” within a municipality, 
Disp, has a positive effect on costs and is also significant, with a confidence level higher than 
95%. This indicates that the higher the number of population centers within a single municipality, 
the higher the costs of solid waste services will be, which is simply a reflection of the greater 
complexity of the organization of the service.  
By contrast, the sign obtained for the frequency variable, Freq, is negative, unlike the 
empirical studies reviewed above, where the significant sign is positive. However, the very low 
degree of variability in the data for the frequency of collection means that this result should be 
treated with caution. Indeed, one of the characteristics of intermunicipal cooperation – a 
particularly common practice in Aragon - is that it leads to greater collection frequency, especially 
in the smaller municipalities. Thus, it might be the case that frequency is negatively associated 
with costs because of the fact that the high number of municipalities working in comarcas and 
mancomunidades means that collection frequency becomes disconnected from municipality size, 
without representing an increase in costs. This might also explain why the smaller Aragonese 
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municipalities have a higher collection frequency than that reported in other institutional settings. 
Indeed, in Aragon collection frequency is highly independent of municipality size. In 84% of the 
municipalities in the sample the frequency is six times per week. However, it is among the 
municipalities with the lowest levels of population that the greatest differences are observed in 
comparison to other institutional settings. 
The rest of the variables included in the model have the expected sign, but show no 
significant relation to costs. Thus, our analysis indicates that in Aragon the intermunicipal 
cooperation variable lacks statistical significance when considering the aggregate sample and 
municipalities with larger populations are included.  
Table 7 presents the results obtained from the estimation of the equation for different 
population segments. The F-test indicates that the equation is very significant at the 1% level. 
The Ramsey-RESET test does not allow us to reject the hypothesis of the non-absence of 
significant variables with a confidence level of 99%. The value of R2 ranges from 74% 
(municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants) and 85% (municipalities with fewer than 20,000 
inhabitants), suggesting that the estimations fit the data reasonably well. These models are also 
valid for explaining the service costs of waste, based on the study of perturbation and the 
systematic part of the model.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Our results are largely similar in the three estimations that aggregate municipalities of 
up to 5,000, 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants and essentially coincide with those obtained in the 
estimation for the aggregate sample. Further, most of our results are consistent with expectations, 
and are supported by findings in the literature. The variable population (Pop) increases the cost of 
the service, presenting a confidence level higher than 99%. The dispersion of municipalities 
(Disp) and salary costs per employee (Wage) also increase service costs and are both significant 
determinants. Municipal cooperation (Coop) reduces costs in those municipalities with lower 
populations, i.e., municipalities providing the service as part of an association obtain a reduction 
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in costs at a confidence level higher than 95%. However, cooperation (Coop) loses its significance 
in the estimation for municipalities of fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, when including 
municipalities of 10,001 to 20,000 inhabitants in the sample. 
Our findings regarding intermunicipal cooperation and costs are similar to those reported 
in Bel and Costas (2006) but differ from those obtained by Sørensen (2007). We believe that a 
variety of factors might explain why our results differ from the latter author’s. First, we use 
different empirical models; in our case we adopt the Hirsch-Stevens model and so control for key 
factors such as municipality dispersion, frequency, output and form of production (public or 
private). Second, we estimate separate subsamples according to municipality size, and so can 
focus our attention on the smallest towns. Furthermore, the average population of the 
municipalities in Aragon (at around 1,700 inhabitants) is much smaller than that of the 
Norwegian municipalities (over 10,300 inhabitants); therefore, the potential for exploiting scale 
economies through cooperation is much greater in Spain, and particularly in Aragon. Finally, 
intermunicipal cooperation is compatible with private production in Spain, whereas it is not in 
Norway. 
 Interestingly, and contrary to what is typically reported in the empirical literature, 
collection frequency is associated with lower municipal costs, at a confidence level higher than 
95%. We are able to confirm that in the region of Aragon, the high rate of collection frequency 
seen in most municipalities, especially the smaller ones, does not increase the municipal costs of 
the service, given that in most cases the municipalities have formed associations with their 
counterparts through “comarcas” or “mancomunidades” to produce the service. Thus, intermunicipal 
cooperation can help the smallest municipalities provide a better quality service without raising 
individual costs. 
Finally, the variables “population density” (Dens), “private production of the service” 
(Prod) and “existence of landfill in the municipality” (Land) do not present a significant relation 
with municipal costs.  
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4.1. Analysis of the existence of scale economies 
The double logarithmic model enables scale economies to be simply measured on a 
global level. Based on the formula of Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1988), scale economies can be 
expressed as follows: 
Pop
TCPobl
PopTCS



)(  
 
Scale economies exist when S>1. In the presence of a double logarithmic function, this 
formula has a simple application (2). 
1
1

S    (2) 
 
Consequently, scale economies exist when 1<1. Table 8 shows the results obtained in 
the different tests carried out under the hypothesis of the absence of scale economies (H0: 11), 
contrasted against the alternative hypothesis that scale economies do exist (H1: 1<1), indicating 
that the hypothesis of the absence of scale economies cannot be rejected for either the aggregated 
estimation or for the estimations of segments of municipalities by population. However, it is of 
little surprise that scale economies are not found in our geographical context of reference. The 
instruments of management reform used by the municipalities, i.e., increased outsourcing and/or 
the numerous examples of supramunicipal aggregation of the service (particularly among smaller 
municipalities), have had the effect of exploiting scale economies in the relevant segment of 
municipalities. Hence, not many scale economies remain to be exploited. 
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
4.2. Stability of the model, the test of structural change 
When cost functions are available, it is always interesting to contrast the null hypothesis 
that the cost equation is stable to the form of production of the service (no structural change 
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exists) against the alternative that there is structural instability between public and private 
production, i.e.,  to test whether a dummy variable of the form of production is a correct 
specification for the cost comparison. If structural instability between public production and 
private production is obtained, a dummy variable would be an incorrect specification.  
The most typically used contrast for this type of analysis is the Chow test. As can be 
seen in Table 9, when we conducted this test for our model, we were unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that the cost equation is stable to the form of production of the service, at a 
confidence level of 99%. To sum up, the dummy variable “form of production of the service” is 
a correct specification for comparing municipal costs between private production and public 
production. 
 [Insert Table 9] 
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5. Conclusions 
In this empirical study we have conducted a multivariate analysis of the factors that influence the 
municipal costs paid for solid waste services. In addition to the factors typically included in the 
literature, we have incorporated intermunicipal cooperation and an analysis of the degree of 
dispersion of municipalities, given the particular characteristics of our area of study, a sample of 
municipalities in the region of Aragon, Spain.  
The empirical results have a high explanatory power and, in general, are consistent with 
the hypotheses established in the empirical evidence. In our model, however, one variable not 
previously considered in the literature, the “dispersion of municipalities” (number of population 
units within a municipal jurisdiction), was found to be significant. Thus, a greater degree of 
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dispersion (Disp) within a municipal area affects total costs positively, as the complexity of the 
service is necessarily increased.  
At the same time, the “intermunicipal cooperation” variable (Coop) leads to a reduction 
in costs in municipalities with smaller populations, i.e., small municipalities providing the service 
as an association incur lower service costs. In short, the high level of municipal cooperation in 
operation in Aragon has two main effects: on the one hand, cooperation reduces service costs, 
while, on the other, it raises collection frequency in the smallest municipalities, thereby improving 
the quality of the service.  
Our empirical analysis, however, failed to find any evidence of scale economies in the 
service. This, however, is not surprising given a geographical context in which the instruments of 
management reform adopted by the municipalities (contracting-out and/or supramunicipal 
aggregation of the service) have had the effect of creating scale economies in the sector in 
practically all the region’s municipalities. 
Other variables, including a larger municipal population (Pop) and salaries (Wage), have 
been found to be significant in explaining the endogenous variable, its sign - positive in both 
instances - in line with the expected results. However, no significant relation was found between 
population density (Dens) and the municipal costs of the service.  
Finally, a comparison of public and private forms of production (Prod) failed to reveal 
any significant differences in costs. This result confirms previous recent analyses, which in the 
main report that competition is a more relevant factor than ownership in solid waste services 
provision. Thus, managing competition and reforming the scale at which the service is delivered 
by means of intermunicipal cooperation can be effective tools for enhancing solid waste delivery, 
particularly in areas in which small municipalities predominate. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Representativeness of the information 
Municipalities with more than 1,000 habitants 
Number of 
inhabitants 
1,001-2,000 2,001-5,000 5,001-10,000 > 10,000 Total > 1,000 
Number of 
municipalities 
14 27 6 9 56 
Percentage 24.56% 77.14% 75% 75% 50% 
Population 19,012 80,797 44,634 791,190 935,633 
Percentage 25% 79.82% 76.65% 94.75% 87.40% 
All municipalities in Aragon (> 1,000 inhabitants) and population (2003) 
Number of 
inhabitants 
1,001-2,000 2,001-5,000 5,001 a 10,000 > 10,000 Total > 1,000 
Number 
municipalities 
57 35 8 12 112 
Population 76,035 101,219 58,234 834,992 1,070,480 
Source: Authors’ own drawn from the 1st Survey on the Production of Urban Solid Waste Services and Water Supply in 
Aragon. Data on population obtained from the Spanish National Statistic Institute. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Production forms for solid waste collection in Aragon (2003) 
Aragon (2003) 
Direct public 
management 
 Public firm  Private firm  Total 
Municipality size 
(population) 
N %  N %  N %  N 
1,001-2,000 5 35.7  1 7.1  8 57.1  14 
2,001-5,000 5 18.5  2 7.4  20 74.1  27 
5,001-10,000 1 16.7  0 0.0  5 83.3  6 
>10,000 4 44.4  1 11.2  4 44.4  9 
Total (adjusted)* 15 29.9  4 7.2  37 62.9  56 
* Aggregated results have been adjusted to correct the bias resulting from differences in coverage of the 
sample.
Source: Authors’ own drawn from the 1st Survey. 
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Table 3. Intermunicipal cooperation in Aragon (2003). Municipalities with more than 1,000 habitants (in 
%)  
Municipality Intermunicipal cooperation Total 
Municipality size (population) Number Percentage Number Percentage  
Municipalities between 1,001 and 2,000  3 14.29 18 85.71 21 
Municipalities between 2,001 and 5,000 4 11.43 31 88.57 35 
Municipalities between 5,001-10,000 1 12.50 7 87.50 8 
Municipalities over 10,000 inhabitants 7 58.33 5 41.66 12 
Total  15 18.00* 61 82.00* 76 
Note: * The total results have been adjusted to correct bias by differences in the representation of municipalities in 
the sample.
Source: Estimated based on data from the 1st Survey. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Summary of variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Description  
TC Total costs incurred by the municipality for the service of municipal solid 
wastes, including expenditures for the collection, transport and disposal 
of the centre’s own disposal or treatment. 
 
 
Independent 
Variable  
Description Hypothesis 
POP Number of inhabitants in the municipality in 2003. + 
FREQ Frequency: Number of days per week refuse is collected from each 
location.  
+ 
LAND Landfill in the municipality. Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
landfill is in the municipality and 0 otherwise.  
- 
DENS Population density: Inhabitants per square kilometer (2003).  Ambiguous 
DISP Municipality dispersion: Number of populations units within the 
municipal area (2003).  
+ 
PROD Mode of production: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if a private firm 
produces the service and 0 if a public unit or firm does so. 
Ambiguous 
COOP Intermunicipal cooperation: Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
municipality is significantly involved in intermunicipal cooperation and 0 
otherwise.  
- 
WAGE Wage level: this variable takes the average provincial value for each 
municipality within a province.  
+ 
Source: Authors’ own 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of variables in the model 
Continuous 
variables 
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
TC 438.588,1 2.260.146 11.839 16.950.510 
POP 16.707,73 83.288,44 1.035 626.081 
DISP 5,09 9,68 1 55 
FREQ 5,70 0,85 2 7 
WAGE 25.549,13 2.171,93 23.028,98 27.480,22 
DENS 69,63 131,41 6 712 
Discrete Variables Percent 1 Percent 0 N 
COOP  80,40 19,60 56 
(1=Intermunicipal cooperation; 0= Production municipal level) 
PROD         66,07                 33,93           56 
(1= Private; 0= Public)   
LAND          35,71                64,29          56 
(1= Landfill in the municipality; 0=No landfill) 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
 
Table 6. Empirical results from the estimation of total cost equation 
(Whole sample) 
Independent Variable Whole sample 
Constant -5.9880 
   (-1.51) 
 
POP (log) 0.9906 
       (9.61)** 
 
COOP -0.0705 
 (-1.01) 
 
PROD -0.0361 
 (-0.60) 
 
DISP (log) 0.2039 
       (2.61)** 
 
FREQ (log) -0.3347 
     (-1.78)* 
 
WAGE (log) 1.7158 
     (1.84)* 
 
DENS (log) 0.0104 
(0.14) 
 
LAND -0.0281 
(-0.45) 
 
R2 0.9268 
Adjust R2 0.9144 
F-Test        103.11*** 
Ramsey RESET-test F(3.44)99%= 4.26 F (3.44)= 0.89 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg: 2 (0.05, 1) 95%=3.84 0.50 
White Test =0.3550 
Shapiro-Wilk W Test pr>z= 0.7630 
Variance inflation factor (average VIF) 2.27 
N 56 
Notes: in parentheses, the t-statistic values for the hypothesis that the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.  
Source: Authors’ own. 
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Table 7. Empirical results from the estimation of the equation for different population segments 
Independent Variable Municipalities below 
5,000 inhabitants 
Municipalities below 10,000 
inhabitants 
Municipalities below 
20,000 inhabitants 
Constant -5.5662 
 (-1.20) 
-7.2236 
   (-1.60) 
-6.9732 
   (-1.62) 
POP (log) 1.0912 
       (8.09)*** 
0.9798 
         (8.26)*** 
1.0328 
       (8.49)*** 
COOP -0.1618 
   (-1.94)* 
-0.1497 
    (-1.99)** 
-0.0550 
 (-0.77) 
PROD 0.0511 
 (0.85) 
-0.0128 
 (-0.23) 
-0.0246 
 (-0.39) 
DISP (log) 0.2280 
     (2.52)** 
0.2190 
      (2.57)** 
0.2183 
          (2.79)*** 
FREQ (log) -0.5260 
       (-2.17)** 
-0.5194 
       (-2.14)** 
-0.3884 
       (-2.08)** 
WAGE (log) 1.6010 
   (1.51) 
2.0300 
     (1.95)* 
1.9108 
     (1.91)* 
DENS (log) -0.0712 
 (-0.90) 
0.0538 
 (0.57) 
0.0080 
 (0.11) 
LAND 0.0125 
 (0.18) 
0.0091 
 (0.14) 
-0.0425 
 (-0.66) 
R2 0.7473 0.7875 0.8563 
Adjust R2 0.6841 0.7428 0.8301 
F -Test         17.17***         29.73***         65.99*** 
R. RESET-test (F) F (3.29)= 0.21 F (3.35)= 0.42 F (3.41)= 0.39 
B-P/Cook-W:          
2(0.05,1) 95%=3.84 
1.14 0.84 1.12 
White Test =0.5387 =0.5615 =0.3287 
Shapiro-Wilk Test pr>z= 0.6615 pr>z= 0.6938 pr>z= 0.4421 
VIF (average) 1.86 1.85 1.86 
N 41 47 53 
Notes: in parentheses, the t-statistic values for the hypothesis that the coefficient is not significantly different 
from zero. 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%; *** 1%.  
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
 
Table 8. Analysis of the existence of economies of scale with output  
 Equation N p-value 
 Whole sample 56 0.5359 
 Municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants 41 0.2519 
 Municipalities below 10,000 inhabitants 47 0.5668 
 Municipalities below 20,000 inhabitants 53 0.3943 
Source: Authors’ own. 
 
 
Table 9. Chow stability test cost function (Adding forms of production) 
 Equation  
N
 
k 
RSS Degrees of 
freedom 
 Whole sample (restricted) 56 8 1.2695 48 
 Municipalities with private production 37 8 0.8197 29 
 Municipalities with public production 19 8 0.2190 11 
Source: Authors’ own. 
